Canadian investigation into Titan submersible implosion cites engineering failures

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) said the installation of the Titan submersible in June 2023 was caused by a combination of engineering errors and risk management that was “impeded by the structure and composition of the company,” Oceangate.

Officials are also urging more regulation to help prevent a similar disaster.

On Wednesday, the TSB released the details of its investigation into this past accident and the lives of five people who were diving to visit the Titanic. The report is based on its engineering analysis of materials and components found at the crash site, combined with other investigative data.

“The construction and testing of the Titan did not follow standard engineering practices,” the report said.

“Because of this, OceanGate did not know how long the Titan’s pressure would remain the same if it was used repeatedly to dive deep into the Titanic.”

On June 18, 2023, the submersible went missing in the northern Atlantic Ocean during an underwater tour of the Titanic shipwreck site.

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The report determined that the design and construction of the submersible was one of the main reasons it was installed.

“An analysis by TSB Laboratory determined that the reduced strength of the Titan’s carbon fiber cylinder, as well as possible defects introduced during the manufacturing, operation, storage, and transportation of the Titan, likely led to the cylinder’s gradual failure, due to accumulated damage during each dive cycle, until entry.

The report also says that the use of carbon fiber in a manned underwater body intended for deep-sea exploration is “novel,” and that these applications often mean that underwater objects should be in the shape of a sphere, rather than a cylinder, because they can better withstand high water pressure.

Although the Titan submersible has completed many previous dives, including the Titanic wreck, TSB says OceanGate was unable to adequately determine how long the carbon fiber hull would remain intact after repeated dives.

The report includes a list of six recommendations “to eliminate or reduce safety deficiencies that pose a significant risk to the transportation system and require action by regulators and the industry.”

• First, the TSB says the Department of Transportation should develop risk-based monitoring methods and priorities specific to Canada’s uninsured commercial vessels. The TSB says its investigation found there was a lack of regulatory oversight in the case of the Titan’s operation, which meant more risk to those involved, and added that this was not an isolated situation.
• Second, the TSB says the Department of Transport should establish a common oversight approach that focuses on risk and priorities for commercial vessels registered outside of port state control.
• Thirdly, the Ministry of Transport should establish a series of procedures to obtain information from other government departments about the operation of commercial vessels. This, the report says, is to help better assess any risks and act accordingly.
• Fourth, the TSB recommends that the Department of Transport talk to the International Maritime Organization to include specific guidelines in international conventions or codes. The TSB hereby makes reference to Maritime Safety Committee Circular 981 (MSC 981), which includes guidelines for the design, construction and operation of underwater passenger-carrying vessels.
• Fifth, if the International Maritime Organization adopts the MSC 9812 guidelines, the TSB says that the Ministry of Transport should require that all manned submersibles registered in Canada, operate with a Canadian support vessel (like the Titan was accompanied by the Canadian Polar Prince support vessel), or operate in Canadian waters or MSC18 economic requirements only. International Maritime Organization.
• Finally, the TSB recommends that the Department of Transport ensure that when one or more parties work on a Canadian vessel, or that otherwise operates under the Coasting Trade Act, those parties must coordinate their operations and safety management through coordination documents and other procedures. This, the report says, will help prevent security gaps that may arise if operations are not properly coordinated.

– More to come

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